Abstract

The challenge by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, and a prior challenge by DOJ and Federal Communications Commission to Comcast’s acquisition of NBC-Universal, has increased attention on vertical mergers. The standard approach identifies a tactic that the merged firm would employ that is both profitable and harms consumers. This approach misses the target; a profitable but anticompetitive tactic may be necessary but is not sufficient. The “Coase theorem” implies that courts and enforcement agencies should instead focus on why vertical integration is necessary to achieve an outcome that would be profitable to the merging firms. The focus on the tactic rather than why ownership matters presumes that vertical merger is necessary, without supporting theory or evidence. The same proposition should hold for horizontal mergers, but the required strength of evidence is greater for vertical mergers because mergers between complement providers are first-order beneficial and the conduct facilitated by horizontal mergers but not vertical mergers is typically illegal.

中文翻译：

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纵向合并，科斯定理和证明责任

摘要

司法部（DOJ）对AT＆T收购时代华纳（Time Warner）的挑战，以及司法部（DOJ）和联邦通信委员会（Communication Communications Commission）对康卡斯特（Comcast）收购NBC-Universal的先前挑战，都增加了对垂直合并的关注。标准方法确定了合并后的公司将采用既有利可图又危害消费者的策略。这种方法没有达到目标。有利可图但反竞争的策略可能是必要的，但还不够。“科斯定理”意味着法院和执法机构应侧重于为什么必须进行纵向整合才能实现对合并公司有利的结果。关注策略而不是所有权为什么重要的前提是，在没有理论或证据支持的情况下，垂直合并是必要的。