This paper highlights two recurring facets of the way UK courts approach the construction of patent claims: the adoption of methods typically applied to the interpretation of contracts and the recognition that immaterial variations not expressly claimed nevertheless fall within the scope of protection. Drawing on the normative implications arising out of Ronald Coase's paper on the problem of social cost, this paper argues that the patent system operates as a substitute for an explicit bargain between economically active entities operating in the market under which a duty is accepted by one party in return for acceptance of a burden of risk by the other. This perspective incorporates both the static costs and the dynamic benefits of the system and accords with the monopoly-profit-incentive theory most commonly advanced in support of the patent system. It is shown how the contemporary approach to claims construction is supported by the object of giving effect to the presumed intentions of the parties to this hypothetical bargain and that this underpins both the implication of terms which go beyond those expressly agreed to by parties to a contract and the construction of patent claims so as to embrace immaterial variations not expressly within their scope.

中文翻译：

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专利权利要求的构成

本文强调了英国法院处理专利权利要求解释方式的两个反复出现的方面：采用通常适用于合同解释的方法，以及承认未明确要求保护的非实质性变化仍属于保护范围。借鉴 Ronald Coase 关于社会成本问题的论文所产生的规范性影响，本文认为专利制度的运作是替代市场上经营的经济活跃实体之间的明确交易，在这种交易下，一方接受义务以换取对方承担风险负担。这种观点结合了制度的静态成本和动态收益，符合支持专利制度的最普遍的垄断-利润-激励理论。它显示了当代的索赔解释方法如何得到实现这一假设交易各方的假定意图的目标的支持，并且这支持了超出合同各方明确同意的条款的含义。以及专利权利要求的结构，以便包含未明确在其范围内的非实质性变化。