I argue that instead of analysing a criminal offence's conduct element in terms of acts and omissions, we should ask whether the defendant has belied a contextually salient expectation as to how she should, or routinely would, conduct herself. Slightly different sets of expectations are salient depending on whether our interest is in questions of criminalisation, or the proper interpretation of existing offences, but the criminal law is normally interested only in conduct-tokens that belie a relevant expectation. Belying such an expectation need not itself suggest culpability, but it does mark out the conduct as remark-able, in the sense of being ‘worthy of remark’.I argue that this ‘Remark-able Conduct Requirement’ (RCR) analysis helps us narrow the field of conduct-tokens that are normatively appropriate candidates for criminalisation, and when adapted for use in interpreting existing offences it: (a) generates familiar and plausible liability outcomes; (b) simplifies the application of the law; (c) offers a principled argument to limit the scope of offences drafted in overly broad terms, by excluding innocuous doings from potential criminal liability; and (d) suggests ways to make progress on philosophical puzzles about how we should conduct ourselves.

中文翻译：

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超越作为和不作为：非凡的犯罪行为

我认为，与其从作为和不作为的角度分析刑事犯罪的行为要素，我们应该询问被告是否违背了关于她应该或通常会如何行为的上下文显着期望。取决于我们的兴趣是对刑事定罪问题还是对现有罪行的适当解释，我们的期望会略有不同，但刑法通常只对不符合相关期望的行为标志感兴趣。不相信这样的期望本身并不意味着有罪，但它确实将行为标记为卓越，在“值得评论”的意义上。我认为这种“卓越行为要求”（RCR）分析有助于我们缩小在规范上适合进行刑事定罪的行为标志的范围，当适用于解释现有罪行时： (a) 产生熟悉和合理的责任结果；(b) 简化法律的适用；(c) 通过将无害行为排除在潜在的刑事责任之外，提供了一个原则性论据，以限制措辞过于宽泛的犯罪范围；(d) 提出在关于我们应该如何行事的哲学难题上取得进展的方法。