What happens when courts reach “good” outcomes through “bad” reasoning? Are there limits to consequentialist jurisprudence? The Indian Supreme Court’s recent decision in IYLA v. State of Kerala offers important insights on both issues. IYLA, decided in September 2018, held that the Hindu temple at Sabarimala may not ban women aged ten to fifty from its premises even though devotees argue the exclusion is religiously mandated. Reactions to IYLA have been vehement and violent, and so far only two women in the prohibited age range have managed to visit the temple. Perhaps any outcome impinging on religious practice would have elicited such responses. Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis, which disregarded devotee perspectives in its eagerness to acknowledge the previously overlooked perspectives of women, is problematic insofar as it superficially upholds the Court’s reputation as a progressive institution while creating bad precedent by further damaging the “essential practices” doctrine. This article draws on case law and legal analysis to demonstrate how the Court’s reasoning paid short shrift to its own doctrines and to conflicting imperatives in the Indian Constitution. The Court’s (and ruling’s) failures underscore the extent to which winning good outcomes through bad reasoning should be sobering rather than satisfying.

中文翻译：

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只是印度教徒

当法院通过“坏”推理达到“好”结果时会发生什么？结果主义法理学有限制吗？印度最高法院最近的裁决IYLA 诉喀拉拉邦就这两个问题提供了重要的见解。伊亚拉，于 2018 年 9 月决定，认为萨巴里马拉的印度教寺庙不得禁止 10 至 50 岁的女性进入其场所，即使奉献者​​认为这种排斥是宗教规定的。反应伊亚拉一直激烈和暴力，到目前为止，只有两名禁止年龄范围内的女性设法参观了这座寺庙。也许任何影响宗教实践的结果都会引起这样的反应。然而，法院的分析忽视了奉献者的观点，急于承认以前被忽视的女性观点，这是有问题的，因为它表面上维护了法院作为进步机构的声誉，同时通过进一步破坏“基本实践”学说创造了不良先例。本文利用判例法和法律分析来证明法院的推理如何对其自身的学说和印度宪法中相互冲突的命令不屑一顾。