Though the Colombian Constitutional Court has had a lead role in granting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) rights since 1998, conservatives mobilizing against LGBT rights between 1991 and 2007 were active in Congress and the streets rather than in court. After 2007, however, conservatives have maintained consistent opposition to rights claims made by LGBT people in the Constitutional Court. This article draws from fieldwork examining the significance of the Constitutional Court’s transition from granting rights to LGBT people as individuals to granting rights to LGBT people as couples and potential families to theorize conservative legal mobilization, particularly moral conservatism. To account for the rise of conservative legal mobilization against LGBT rights in Colombia in 2007, this article expands on the legal opportunity structure model. It theorizes that legal threats––that is, changes in legal rules that are perceived to increase the costs of mobilization or the expected costs of not taking action––are among the factors that lead movements to engage in legal mobilization, even if legal opportunities are not expanding.

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法律威胁和法律动员的出现：哥伦比亚的保守派动员

尽管自 1998 年以来哥伦比亚宪法法院在授予女同性恋、男同性恋、双性恋和跨性别 (LGBT) 权利方面发挥了主导作用，但在 1991 年至 2007 年期间动员反对 LGBT 权利的保守派在国会和街头而非法庭上活跃。然而，在 2007 年之后，保守派一直反对 LGBT 人士在宪法法院提出的权利主张。本文借鉴了实地调查，考察了宪法法院从授予 LGBT 个人权利到授予 LGBT 夫妻和潜在家庭权利的转变的重要性，以理论化保守的法律动员，特别是道德保守主义。考虑到 2007 年哥伦比亚反对 LGBT 权利的保守法律动员的兴起，本文扩展了法律机会结构模型。它从理论上认为，法律威胁——即被认为会增加动员成本或不采取行动的预期成本的法律规则的变化——是导致运动参与法律动员的因素之一，即使有法律机会没有扩大。