Existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes based on notional accounts (NAs) have chosen the defined-contribution (DC) setting that forces the rate of interest credited to all individual accounts to change over time to ensure solvency. On the other hand, volatility of the rate of interest is the source of non-negligible disparities of individual internal rates of return (IRRs) both within and across generations. It is argued that these disparities represent a threat to the political appeal of PAYG DC systems, in particular in the present situation characterized by low growth rates of the contribution base. The paper uses a four-overlapping-generations model to prove that the DC setting is not a necessary ingredient of NAs and that their political appeal could be enhanced by extending their use to non-DC pension systems. In fact, redistributions can be avoided by crediting all individual accounts with a constant rate of interest while ensuring financial solvency by fine-tuning of the contribution rate to make the system's revenues grow at the same (constant) rate credited to all accounts. The proof requires constancy of the employment growth rate but not of average earnings. Changes in the employment growth rate produce small oscillations around perfect balance between contribution revenue and pension expenditure manageable with a small buffer fund.

现有的基于名义账户（NAs）的即付即用（PAYG）方案选择了定义缴款（DC）设置，该设置强制记入所有单个账户的利率随时间变化以确保偿付能力。另一方面，利率的波动性是各代内部和各代之间个人内部收益率（IRR）不可忽略的差异的来源。有人认为，这些差距构成了对现收现付制的政治吸引力的威胁，特别是在以缴费基数增长率低为特征的当前情况下。本文使用了一个四代重叠的模型来证明，DC设置不是NA的必要组成部分，并且可以通过将其扩展到非DC养老金系统来增强其政治吸引力。事实上，可以通过以恒定利率贷记所有单个帐户来避免重新分配，同时可以通过微调缴费率来确保系统的收入以贷记所有帐户的相同（恒定）增长率来确保财务偿付能力。证明需要恒定的就业增长率，而不是平均收入。就业增长率的变化使缴费收入和养老金支出之间的完美平衡在较小的缓冲基金的控制下产生了小的波动。证明需要恒定的就业增长率，而不是平均收入。就业增长率的变化使缴费收入和养老金支出之间的完美平衡在较小的缓冲基金的控制下产生了小的波动。证明需要恒定的就业增长率，而不是平均收入。就业增长率的变化使缴费收入和养老金支出之间的完美平衡在较小的缓冲基金的控制下产生了小的波动。