We develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.

中文翻译：

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国家的起源：技术、合作与制度

我们发展了一种国家形成理论，揭示了青铜时代美索不达米亚第一个稳定的国家机构的兴起。我们的分析表明，不利的生产条件和不可预见的创新相结合，促使受旧技术青睐的群体通过将政治和财产权授予拥有新技能和互补技能的无权个人来建立国家。通过这些改革，精英们让非精英们相信，联合投资的足够回报将通过公共支出来分享，从而合作并积累合作文化。与主要的替代理论不同，我们强调：（1）群体形成在很大程度上受到风险分担和创新回报的不可预见冲击的影响；(2) 特定群体技能的互补性，而不是暴力，是国家形成的关键决定因素；(3) 军事、商人，尤其是宗教阶层有利于国家的形成和文化的积累。