The liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter of the 2007–2009 crisis. The LCR brings some financial-stability benefits, including a significant maturity extension of triparty repos backed by lower-quality collateral, as well as the accumulation of larger liquidity pools. However, it also leads to less liquidity transformation by broker-dealers. We also discuss the liquidity risks not addressed by the LCR. Finally, we show that a major source of fire-sale risk was self-corrected before the introduction of postcrisis regulations.

中文翻译：

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流动性监管和金融中介

流动性覆盖率（LCR）要求银行持有足够的流动性来承受 30 天的运行。我们研究了 LCR 对经纪自营商（即 2007-2009 年危机中心的金融中介机构）的影响。LCR 带来了一些金融稳定的好处，包括由低质量抵押品支持的三方回购的显着到期延长，以及更大流动性池的积累。然而，这也导致经纪自营商的流动性转换减少。我们还讨论了 LCR 未解决的流动性风险。最后，我们表明，在引入危机后法规之前，甩卖风险的主要来源是自我纠正的。