We trace a corporate governance channel of bank shock transmission into the real economy. Using 1,245 U.S. bank enforcement actions (EAs) issued between 1990 and 2017, we show that when a nonfinancial firm (NFF) and bank share a common director, NFF stock prices fall around bank EAs. Severe EAs elicit more negative returns. During enforcement, valued directors substitute NFF board meeting attendance with bank board meeting attendance. Impaired credit relationships, director reputational damage, and endogenous director selection cannot fully explain our results. These findings imply that shared directors could transmit larger bank shocks into the real economy.

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忽视彼得修复保罗：共同董事如何将银行冲击传递给非金融公司

我们追溯了银行冲击传导至实体经济的公司治理渠道。使用 1990 年至 2017 年间发布的 1,245 项美国银行执法行动 (EA)，我们表明，当一家非金融公司 (NFF) 和银行共享一名共同董事时，NFF 股价围绕银行 EA 下跌。严重的 EA 会产生更多的负回报。在执行期间，有价值的董事将出席 NFF 董事会会议替换为出席银行董事会会议。信用关系受损、董事声誉受损和内生董事选择不能完全解释我们的结果。这些发现表明，共同董事可能会将更大的银行冲击传递到实体经济中。