We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already-well-governed firms.

中文翻译：

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通过股东倡议改变治理：代理访问的案例

我们研究了一项监管变化，该变化导致 2012 年至 2016 年有 300 多份股东提议建立代理访问权，以及 250 多家公司采用代理访问权。预计从代理访问权中受益最大的公司对收到提案的市场反应最为积极，但收养并不集中在这些公司。我们发现，提议和投票的股东不会区分会或不会受益的公司，并且管理层会抵制那些受益最多的公司的代理访问权。这一过程导致采用集中在已经管理良好的大型公司。