We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in credit default swap spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger shareholder control, through the “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term.

中文翻译：

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加强股东控制对债券持有人的影响

我们研究了更强的股东控制对债券持有人的影响。我们发现，股东发起的治理提案的通过导致信用违约掉期利差下降，这表明对债券持有人产生了净积极影响。有证据表明，通过“管理纪律”渠道加强股东控制的直接好处大于直接升级股东与债券持有人冲突和间接加剧股东机会主义风险的综合不利影响。对于存在高水平股东-债券持有人冲突的公司以及在不加剧风险转移的情况下减轻管理固守的提议，结果更为强劲。最后，从长远来看，更强的股东控制可以提高信用评级和经营业绩。