International anticorruption treaties create an almost universal requirement that States sanction legal persons for the crime of foreign bribery. However, the vast majority of corporate foreign bribery cases are ‘settled’ between governments and firms. Analysing key anticorruption instruments and treaty body reports, it appears there is a dearth of express rules on settlements in international law but a qualified implicit endorsement of domestic settlement laws and practices. The international regime is investigated in terms of its move towards common standards for the use of settlements, and whether recommendations are consistent with stated objectives. The analysis discloses an irony: States and international organisations fail to clearly articulate their expectations on settlements, while calling for transparent, effective and predictable domestic settlement rules.

中文翻译：

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在外国贿赂案件中对公司和解的国际认可

国际反腐败条约创造了一个几乎普遍的要求，即国家制裁犯有外国贿赂罪的法人。然而，绝大多数企业海外贿赂案件是在政府和企业之间“解决”的。分析关键的反腐败文书和条约机构的报告，似乎国际法中缺乏关于和解的明确规则，但对国内和解法律和实践的隐含认可。国际制度的调查是根据其对定居点使用的共同标准的发展，以及建议是否与既定目标一致。分析揭示了一个讽刺：国家和国际组织未能明确表达他们对解决方案的期望，同时呼吁透明、