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Ordeals, inequalities, moral hazard and non-monetary incentives in health care
Economics & Philosophy ( IF 1.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-28 , DOI: 10.1017/s0266267120000127
Daniel M. Hausman

This essay begins by summarizing the reasons why unregulated health-care markets are inefficient. The inefficiencies stem from the asymmetries of information among providers, patients and payers, which give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection. Attempts to ameliorate these inefficiencies by means of risk-adjusted insurance and monetary incentives such as co-pays and deductibles lessen the inefficiencies at the cost of increasing inequalities. Another possibility is to rely on non-monetary incentives, including ordeals. While not a magic bullet, these are feasible methods for addressing the inadequacies of market provision of health care, such as moral hazard.



中文翻译:

卫生保健中的折磨,不平等,道德风险和非金钱诱因

本文首先概述了不受监管的医疗保健市场效率低下的原因。效率低下的原因是提供者,患者和付款人之间的信息不对称,从而导致道德风险和逆向选择。尝试通过风险调整保险和共同激励和免赔额等货币激励措施来改善这些低效率现象,以增加不平等为代价来减少低效率现象。另一种可能性是依靠非货币激励措施,包括折磨。这些不是解决问题的灵丹妙药,但它们是解决医疗保健市场提供不足(例如道德风险)的可行方法。

更新日期:2020-05-28
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