Abstract

This article argues that financial inclusion policy in Pakistan has been subsumed by the regulatory needs of the central bank, opening a divide between the ‘development approach’ of donors and the ‘regulatory approach’ of the central bank. This shift is identified in an emerging macro turn in central bank discourse and policy, which is steering the National Financial Inclusion Strategy away from the person-centred donor-driven agenda towards the imperative of shoring up rupee governance amidst burgeoning informal markets, low levels of bank intermediation and high levels of currency-in-circulation. The article argues that this rerouting of financial inclusion policy is ultimately a consequence of the central bank’s failure to grasp effective policy control over the rupee following rapid economic liberalization in the 1990s. The article explores why growing informality in money and markets is a problem for monetary governance; how financial inclusion answers to this predicament; and why the shift from poverty alleviation to monetary control remains unforeseen by donors. The article shows why inflation targeting – itself core to the wider liberalization project – hinges on the success of financial inclusion, thus revealing an important new driver propelling the financial inclusion agenda forward amidst implicit and unforeseen conflict between donors and the national leadership.

摘要

本文认为，巴基斯坦的金融包容性政策已被中央银行的监管需求所包含，从而在捐助者的“发展方式”和中央银行的“监管方式”之间产生了分歧。这种转变体现在中央银行话语和政策正在出现的宏观转变中，这正在将国家金融包容性战略从以人为中心的捐助者驱动的议程转向在新兴的非正规市场、低水平的非正规市场中支持卢比治理的必要性。银行中介和高水平的流通货币。文章认为，金融包容性政策的这种重新安排最终是由于 1990 年代快速经济自由化后中央银行未能掌握对卢比的有效政策控制的结果。这篇文章探讨了为什么货币和市场中日益增长的非正规性是货币治理的一个问题；普惠金融如何应对这一困境；以及为什么捐助者无法预见从扶贫到货币控制的转变。这篇文章说明了为什么通胀目标制——其本身是更广泛的自由化项目的核心——取决于普惠金融的成功，从而揭示了在捐助者与国家领导层之间隐含和不可预见的冲突中推动普惠金融议程向前发展的重要新动力。