ABSTRACT

Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often appeal to the reliable causal covariance between bodily sensations and certain kinds of bodily conditions or to the corresponding biological function that these bodily sensations are supposed to fulfill. In this paper, I argue on the basis of recent empirical research that arguments from reliable causal covariance and biological function cannot motivate the introduction of corresponding intentional content. In particular, I argue that bodily sensations are caused by a heterogeneous class of physiological and psychological factors and their biological functions are too diverse to be reduced to the representation of a particular bodily condition. Responses are available to strong representationalists, but they either require substantial alterations to their core assumptions or incur a significant empirical burden.

抽象的

身体感觉（例如疼痛，饥饿，瘙痒或性感觉）通常以现象特征来表征。为了解释这种现象，许多哲学家采取了强有力的代表主义。根据这种观点，身体感觉基本上和完全由与身体的特定状况有关的有意含量决定。例如，疼痛不过是对实际或潜在组织损伤的表示而已。为了激发和证明他们的观点，强有力的代表主义者经常呼吁身体感觉与某些身体条件之间的可靠因果协方差，或者呼吁这些身体感觉应实现的相应生物学功能。在本文中，我根据最近的实证研究认为，可靠的因果协方差和生物学功能引起的争论不能激励相应的有意内容的引入。特别是，我认为，身体感觉是由生理和心理因素的异质性引起的，它们的生物学功能过于多样化，无法还原为特定身体状况的代表。强大的代表性主义者可以做出回应，但是他们要么需要对其核心假设进行实质性改动，要么会带来巨大的经验负担。我认为，身体感觉是由生理和心理因素的异质性引起的，它们的生物学功能过于多样化，无法还原为特定身体状况的代表。强大的代表性主义者可以做出回应，但是他们要么需要对其核心假设进行实质性改动，要么会带来巨大的经验负担。我认为，身体感觉是由生理和心理因素的异质性引起的，它们的生物学功能过于多样化，无法还原为特定身体状况的代表。强大的代表性主义者可以做出回应，但是他们要么需要对其核心假设进行实质性改动，要么会带来巨大的经验负担。