ABSTRACT

Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and articulate these different methods and argue that they better explain several paradigmatic appeals to cases. This result not only challenges the homogeneity of the method of cases; it also stocks our methodological toolbox with additional interpretive tools which help us to not only better understand philosophical arguments, but to better understand the significance of experimental work.

摘要

实验哲学把注意力集中在对哲学案例的直觉反应在哲学论证中所扮演的角色上。诉诸此类案件的方法被称为“案件方法”，在最近的工作中，爱德华·马切里（Edouard Machery）捍卫了其在哲学实践中的普遍性和统一性，并批评了其认识论价值。在本文中，我认为没有单一的案例方法，而是一套案例方法。为了捍卫这一主张，我区分并阐明了这些不同的方法，并认为它们可以更好地解释针对案件的几种范式诉求。这一结果不仅挑战了案件方法的同质性；它还在我们的方法学工具箱中存储了其他解释工具，这些工具不仅可以帮助我们更好地理解哲学论证，