ABSTRACT

Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and they argue that this places the burden of proof on antirealists. More broadly, appeals to intuition in metaethics typically assume that folk judgments are generally consistent across individuals, such that they are at least predominantly something, if not realist. A substantial body of empirical work on moral objectivism has investigated these assumptions, but findings remain inconclusive due to methodological limitations. Objectivist judgments classify individuals into broad categories of realism and antirealism, but they do not address more specific conflicts in the metaethical literature between different types of realism and antirealism, such as between nonnaturalism and divine command theory, or between noncognitivism and error theory. Further, the data currently show that the folk are objectivists about some moral claims but not others, raising questions that have not been addressed in previous studies about how much of the moral domain is judged to be objective, and about how endorsements of different types of realism and antirealism are distributed among different types of moral claims. Here, I present a new survey that addresses these limitations. The results challenge both of the empirical assumptions identified above, with important implications for metaethical methodology.

摘要

道德现实主义者通常认为民间直觉主要是现实主义者，他们认为这给反现实主义者带来了举证责任。更广泛地讲，在超伦理学中对直觉的呼吁通常假设民间判断在各个个体之间通常是一致的，因此即使不是现实主义者，它们至少也是主要的东西。关于道德客观主义的大量实证研究已经研究了这些假设，但是由于方法论上的局限性，研究结果尚无定论。客观主义的判断将个人分为现实主义和反现实主义的大类，但它们并未解决在元伦理文学中不同类型的现实主义和反现实主义之间的更具体的冲突，例如非自然主义和神圣命令理论之间，非认知主义和错误理论之间的冲突。进一步，当前的数据表明，人们是关于某些道德主张的客观主义者，而在其他道德主张上不是客观主义者，这提出了以前的研究中尚未解决的问题：关于道德领域的多少被认为是客观的，以及对不同类型的现实主义和反现实主义分布在不同类型的道德主张中。在这里，我提出了一项解决这些局限性的新调查。结果挑战了上面确定的两个经验假设，对元伦理学方法学具有重要意义。以及关于不同类型的现实主义和反现实主义的认可如何在不同类型的道德主张之间分配。在这里，我提出了一项解决这些局限性的新调查。结果挑战了上面确定的两个经验假设，对元伦理学方法学具有重要意义。以及关于不同类型的现实主义和反现实主义的认可如何在不同类型的道德主张之间分配。在这里，我提出了一项解决这些局限性的新调查。结果挑战了上面确定的两个经验假设，对元伦理学方法学具有重要意义。