ABSTRACT

Lately, it seems a number of philosophical memory theories are incorporating false memory phenomena into their conceptual frameworks. At the same time, scientific research is extending its analysis of false memories to nondeclarative forms of memory. However, both sides have paid little attention to the notion of false procedural memory. Yet, from everyday experience as well as from psychological investigation, we are aware of different ways procedural memory goes wrong. Here, I characterize the conceptual foundation of false procedural memory. First, I distinguish remembering-how from knowing-how by proposing that remembering-how requires the performance of an act. Accordingly, genuine remembering-how is characterized as the performance of an act for which a respective ability has been acquired that is instrumental in the execution of said act. False remembering-how is identified as a kind of error where a subject acquires the ability to perform a certain act, which is then correctly executed, but is not what the subject tried to perform. This framework of false procedural memory is delineated from notions of interference and crosstalk. A comparison with current philosophical theories of false memory and analysis showing the relevance for current psychological research and everyday life concludes the paper.

抽象的

最近，似乎许多哲学记忆理论正在将虚假记忆现象纳入其概念框架。同时，科学研究正在将对错误记忆的分析扩展到非声明性记忆形式。但是，双方都很少注意虚假程序记忆的概念。然而，从日常经验和心理调查中，我们意识到程序记忆出错的不同方式。在这里，我描述了虚假程序记忆的概念基础。首先，我通过提出记忆方式需要表演来区分记忆方式和专有技术。因此，真正的记忆方式的特征在于行为的执行，对于该行为，已经获得了在执行所述行为中起重要作用的相应能力。错误的记忆方式被识别为一种错误，即受试者获得了执行某种行为的能力，然后正确执行了该行为，但不是受试者试图执行的行为。错误程序存储的这种框架是从干扰和串扰的概念中划定的。通过与当前错误记忆的哲学理论进行比较和分析，得出与当前心理学研究和日常生活相关的结论。