Abstract

Judicial selection methods have been reformed in many states over the 20th century. I will show how changing electoral institutions have influenced judicial behavior. To do this, I employ an original dataset and a causal inference methodology to estimate the impact of reforming a state’s selection system from partisan to nonpartisan elections on opinion writing behavior. I predict that justices, initially elected through partisan elections, will write more dissenting opinions once they face nonpartisan retention elections. The results suggest that electoral reform leads to justices authoring more dissenting opinions than they otherwise would have. Most who favor electoral reform posit that the removal of partisan labels increases the legitimacy of state supreme courts. However, if the demise of consensual norms on courts threatens their legitimacy, then electoral reform appears to have a counter-intuitive outcome. This article contributes to our understanding of how elections impact judicial behavior.

摘要

在20世纪，许多州都对司法选拔方法进行了改革。我将展示不断变化的选举机构如何影响司法行为。为此，我采用了原始数据集和因果推论方法来评估将州选择系统从党派选举转变为无党派选举对意见撰写行为的影响。我预计，最初是通过党派选举选出的大法官一旦面临无党派保留选举，就会发表更多不同意见。结果表明，选举改革导致大法官们提出了比他们原本更多的反对意见。多数支持选举改革的人认为，取消党派标签会增加州最高法院的合法性。但是，如果法院同意性准则的废除威胁到其合法性，那么选举改革似乎会产生违反直觉的结果。本文有助于我们了解选举如何影响司法行为。