ABSTRACT

In the USA, endangered species are federally protected under the Endangered Species Act. Yet they can be harmed under the condition that impacts on their habitats are mitigated. This is known as the no-net loss principle. To do so, public regulators acknowledge conservation banks and endangered species credit production as the most robust policy instruments, as they allow for ecological restoration ahead of impacts. The aim of this paper is to show how endangered species credits, as ‘environmental intangibles,’ are designed and produced so as to meet two diverging objectives, that is, ensuring permanent conservation and attracting private investors. Permanent conservation is ensured through financial insurances, which tie environmental intangibles to a very tangible asset, land. Therefore, environmental credit-making is not only a matter of scientific measurement; as commodities crafted out of government regulation, environmental intangibles also need to be legally stabilized, including through the use of property and financial tools. This securement entails important production costs that limit investors’ profits. Environmental field-level bureaucrats play a central role in understanding this tension, as they organize trade-offs between finance and conservation temporality so as to ensure the production of environmental intangibles permanently linked to land and ecosystems.

摘要

在美国，濒危物种受《濒危物种法》的联邦保护。然而，在减轻对其栖息地的影响的情况下，它们可能会受到伤害。这被称为无净损失原则。为此，公共监管机构承认保护银行和濒危物种信贷生产是最有力的政策工具，因为它们允许在影响之前进行生态恢复。本文的目的是展示濒危物种信用作为“环境无形资产”是如何设计和生产的，以满足两个不同的目标，即确保永久保护和吸引私人投资者。通过金融保险确保永久保护，将环境无形资产与非常有形的资产土地联系起来。因此，环境信用不仅是一个科学衡量的问题；作为政府监管下制作的商品，环境无形资产也需要在法律上稳定下来，包括通过使用财产和金融工具。这种保障需要限制投资者利润的重要生产成本。环境领域的官僚在理解这种紧张关系方面发挥着核心作用，因为他们在财务和保护时间之间进行权衡，以确保生产与土地和生态系统永久相关的环境无形资产。这种保障需要限制投资者利润的重要生产成本。环境领域的官僚在理解这种紧张关系方面发挥着核心作用，因为他们在财务和保护时间之间进行权衡，以确保生产与土地和生态系统永久相关的环境无形资产。这种保障需要限制投资者利润的重要生产成本。环境领域的官僚在理解这种紧张关系方面发挥着核心作用，因为他们在财务和保护时间之间进行权衡，以确保生产与土地和生态系统永久相关的环境无形资产。