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Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications
Global Economic Review ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 , DOI: 10.1080/1226508x.2020.1836783
Yuichiro Kamada 1 , Michihiro Kandori 2
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT The present paper provides some examples that illustrate how cooperation is achieved among rational and selfish agents when (i) they prepare their actions in advance and (ii) they have some opportunities to revise their actions. Specifically, we use the framework of revision games introduced by Kamada and Kandori [(2020). “Revision Games.” Econometrica 88: 1599–1630]. To judge the sustainability of cooperation in the examples, we show and utilise a simple and useful lemma.

中文翻译:

改版游戏及部分应用合作

摘要 本文提供了一些例子,说明当(i)他们提前准备他们的行动和(ii)他们有一些机会修改他们的行动时,理性和自私的代理人之间是如何实现合作的。具体来说,我们使用 Kamada 和 Kandori [(2020) 引入的修订游戏框架。“改版游戏。” 计量经济学 88:1599-1630]。为了判断示例中合作的可持续性,我们展示并使用了一个简单而有用的引理。
更新日期:2020-10-01
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