ABSTRACT Using a novel debt enforcement index reflecting legal and economic characteristics directly relating to resolving insolvency across the world, we document that bank loan terms are more stringent (larger interest rate spread, higher collateral requirement, more covenants) in countries with weaker debt enforcement. The effect is more prominent when creditor rights are better protected and debtors are exposed to higher fundamental and informational risks. Improved enforcement has real effects of reducing borrowers’ covenant violation and enhancing their preference for bank funding. Lenders’ syndicates become more concentrated as loan contract enforceability deteriorates. A difference-in-differences analysis of insolvency resolution reforms worldwide confirms the cross-country evidence.

中文翻译：

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债务执行和银行贷款：来自全球破产实践的证据

摘要 我们使用反映与解决全球破产直接相关的法律和经济特征的新型债务执行指数，我们记录了在债务执行较弱的国家银行贷款条款更加严格（更大的利差、更高的抵押要求、更多的契约）。当债权人的权利得到更好的保护，债务人面临更高的基本风险和信息风险时，这种影响更加突出。加强执法对减少借款人违反契约和增强他们对银行融资的偏好具有实际影响。随着贷款合同可执行性的恶化，贷款人的银团变得更加集中。对全球破产解决方案改革的差异分析证实了跨国证据。