Existing studies highlight the importance of the compensatory demand among the conscripted poor to explain why wars lead to income and inheritance tax hikes for the rich. We propose a more nuanced argument that war mobilization leads to a class conflict in which the poor want the rich to pay more taxes in exchange for conscription while the rich seek lower taxes because they expect war-related losses of their wealth. Mass warfare imposes higher tax burdens on the rich only when elites lack economic resources to prevent such policies. Using a panel analysis of up to 18 countries from the late nineteenth century to the 2010s as well as a subnational analysis of Senate roll call votes on tax bills introduced between 1913 and 2008, we corroborate our argument that elites' share of national income conditions how war mobilization shapes the trajectories of tax regimes.

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战争、不平等和税收

现有研究强调了被征召的穷人补偿需求的重要性，以解释为什么战争会导致富人的收入和遗产税上涨。我们提出了一个更微妙的论点，即战争动员会导致阶级冲突，在这种冲突中，穷人希望富人缴纳更多税款以换取征兵，而富人则寻求减税，因为他们期望与战争相关的财富损失。只有当精英缺乏经济资源来阻止此类政策时，大规模战争才会对富人施加更高的税收负担。通过对 19 世纪后期至 2010 年代多达 18 个国家的小组分析以及对参议院对 1913 年至 2008 年间引入的税收法案的唱名投票进行的地方分析，我们证实了我们的论点，即精英