To examine the optimal privatisation of a state holding corporation when the government imposes a corporate profit tax on firms, we consider a multiplant state holding corporation producing differentiated goods, competing with firms in the private sector that may be uniplant or multiplant. This set up applies to many mixed markets. We find that the optimal privatisation depends on not only the degree of product substitution and the production organisation of firms in the private sector, but also on the profit tax imposed on firms. Specifically, the optimal privatisation degree increases with the profit tax imposed on firms. There is more privatisation when state holding corporations are sold to different investors than when they are sold to a single investor, and when firms in the private sector are multiplant than when they are uniplant. Given the degree of privatisation, the private sector reduces more of its production when responding to a higher profit tax rate. Moreover, the hypothesis of profit tax neutrality holds under the optimal degree of privatisation. The result suggests that the effect of the profit tax in mixed markets can be cushioned by privatisation.

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利润税和国有控股公司的最优私有化

为了检验当政府对企业征收企业利润税时国有控股公司的最优私有化，我们考虑生产差异化商品的多厂国有控股公司，与私营部门的公司竞争，这些公司可能是单厂或多厂。这种设置适用于许多混合市场。我们发现最优私有化不仅取决于产品替代程度和私营部门企业的生产组织，还取决于对企业征收的利润税。具体而言，最优私有化程度随着对企业征收的利润税而增加。当国有控股公司出售给不同的投资者时比出售给单一投资者时私有化程度更高，当私营部门的公司是多厂时比单厂时私有化程度更高。鉴于私有化程度，私营部门在应对更高的利润税率时会减少更多的生产。此外，利润税中性假设在最佳私有化程度下成立。结果表明，私有化可以缓冲混合市场中利润税的影响。