Using a panel dataset for the period of 1991–2001, the present paper explores the significant determinants that indicate the likelihood of bankruptcy for chaebol and non‐chaebol firms in Korea, and identifies the differences in the determinants between the two types of firms, with an emphasis on their ownership and financial structures. Logit bankruptcy regressions show that largest shareholder ownership (i.e. ownership concentration) is likely to act as a corporate governance mechanism in reducing bankruptcy risk and that financial stability, operating experience and firm size are also important. In separate regressions for chaebol and non‐chaebol firms, foreign ownership for chaebol firms and ownership concentration for non‐chaebol firms emerge as significantly positive and negative bankruptcy determinants, respectively. In particular, bank ownership is identified as a positive factor for chaebol firms and a negative factor for non‐chaebol firms. These outcomes suggest that ownership concentration and bank ownership are likely to play a monitoring role in lowering bankruptcy risk for non‐chaebol firms. Outcomes from more elaborate estimations also suggest that overall, bank ownership enhances the monitoring role as a substitute for low foreign ownership.

中文翻译：

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公司破产的决定因素：韩国财阀和非财阀公司的证据

本文使用1991-2001年间的面板数据集，探索了表明韩国财阀和非财阀公司破产可能性的重要决定因素，并确定了两种类型公司之间决定因素的差异，强调他们的所有权和财务结构。Logit破产回归显示，大股东的所有权（即所有权集中度）很可能充当降低破产风险的公司治理机制，财务稳定性，运营经验和公司规模也很重要。在财阀公司和非财阀公司的单独回归中，财阀公司的外国所有权和非财阀公司的所有权集中分别显示为明显的破产正负决定因素。特别是，银行所有权被认为是财阀公司的积极因素，而对非财阀公司的不利因素。这些结果表明，所有权集中度和银行所有权可能会在降低非财团法人的破产风险中发挥监督作用。更详尽的估计结果也表明，总体而言，银行所有权可以代替低外资所有权来加强监督作用。