This study revisits the endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly by considering the situation in which a welfare-maximizing government sets the optimal degree of privatization for a partially privatized firm. We present the following results. First, in quantity competition, the government sets the degree of privatization for the partially privatized firm to be positive or zero depending on the equilibrium in the subsequent observable delay game. The observable delay game has multiple equilibria and the firms choose either of two Stackelberg equilibria. Second, in price competition, the government chooses to fully nationalize the partially privatized firm, leading to a unique Bertrand equilibrium in the observable delay game.

中文翻译：

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最优私有化程度下混合双头垄断的内生时机

本研究通过考虑福利最大化的政府为部分私有化的公司设定最佳私有化程度的情况，重新审视了混合双头垄断中的内生时间博弈。我们提出以下结果。首先，在数量竞争中，政府将部分私有化企业的私有化程度设置为正或零，这取决于随后的可观察延迟博弈中的均衡。可观察延迟博弈有多个均衡，公司选择两个 Stackelberg 均衡中的任一个。其次，在价格竞争中，政府选择将部分私有化的企业完全国有化，导致可观察延迟博弈中的独特伯特兰均衡。