We investigate the association between deviations of the monetary policy rate from its benchmark, and systemic risk between 2001 and 2017. We adopt an impulse response function framework that uses the local projections method model proposed by Jorda (2005). We find that paying interest on reserves by the Fed beginning in 2008 introduced a monetary policy regime shift between the period that the Fed did not pay interest on reserves and the period that it did. Consequently, while we identify a positive and significant link between deviations of the policy rate from its benchmark and systemic risk in the former period, this link was broken in the latter period. During the former period, upsurges in the fed funds rate raised bank costs and increased bank distress. In contrast, during the latter period, interest payment on reserves exceeded the policy rate, except for 2009Q1, and as a result, banks did not expand lending in response to the Fed's reserve injections, instead, holding large amounts of excess reserves. This practice produced greater bank profitability and reduced bank liquidity risk and credit risk, without increasing systemic risk.

我们调查了货币政策利率与其基准之间的偏差与2001年至2017年之间的系统风险之间的关联。我们采用了由Jorda（2005）提出的局部预测方法模型的冲激响应函数框架。我们发现，美联储从2008年开始支付准备金利息，这在美联储不支付准备金利息的时期与支付准备金的时期之间引入了货币政策体制的转变。因此，尽管我们在前一时期确定了政策利率与其基准之间的偏差与系统性风险之间存在积极且重要的联系，但在后一时期中这种联系被打破了。在前一个时期，联邦基金利率的飙升提高了银行成本，并增加了银行困境。相反，在后期，除2009年第一季度外，准备金的利息支付超出了政策利率，因此，银行并未因美联储的准备金注入而扩大贷款，而是持有大量的超额准备金。这种做法提高了银行的盈利能力，降低了银行的流动性风险和信用风险，而没有增加系统性风险。