We explore the mechanisms through which subnational informal institutions exacerbate or ameliorate voids in national formal institutions. Informed by a within-country, cross-sub-region case comparison, we find two exacerbating mechanisms: Competition between the logics embedded in national and subnational institutions and the sabotage of a formal national institution by a void in a subnational informal institution. We also find two ameliorating mechanisms: Strong subnational informal institutions substitute for weak national institutions and bridge voids in formal institutions. Finally, we identify the conditions of expectation alignment and engagement associated with the competition, sabotage, substitution, and bridging mechanisms. Our findings contribute to institutional theory by providing a more subtle and contingent understanding of the interaction between informal and formal, and subnational and national, institutions. Our results also suggest ways in which constrained managers and bureaucrats can reduce the effects of voids in national formal institutions.

我们探索了地方非正式机构加剧或改善国家正式机构中的空白的机制。通过对一个国家内，跨次区域案例的比较得知，我们发现了两种加剧的机制：国家和国家以下机构中嵌入的逻辑之间的竞争，以及次国家非正式机构中的空缺破坏了正式的国家机构。我们还发现了两种改善机制：强大的国家以下非正式机构代替了薄弱的国家机构并架起了桥梁正规机构中的空白。最后，我们确定与竞争，破坏，替代和桥接机制相关的期望一致性和参与的条件。我们的发现通过对非正式与正式，国家以下和国家机构之间的相互作用提供了更细微和偶然的理解，从而为制度理论做出了贡献。我们的研究结果还提出了受约束的经理和官僚可以减少国家正规机构中的空缺影响的方式。