This paper investigates the susceptibility of foreign exchange (FX) spot markets to limit order submission strategies that are either intended to create a false impression of the state of the market (‘spoof orders’) or to extract hidden information from the market (‘ping orders’). Using a complete limit order book dataset from Electronic Broking Services (EBS), our findings suggest that spoofing is more likely to succeed in liquid markets, or on primary electronic trading platforms. Pinging, by contrast, might be more prevalent in illiquid markets, or on secondary electronic trading platforms.

中文翻译：

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外汇市场中的欺骗和查验

本文研究了外汇（FX）现货市场对限制订单提交策略的敏感性，该策略旨在造成对市场状态的错误印象（“欺骗订单”）或从市场中提取隐藏信息（“ ping”）命令'）。使用来自电子经纪服务（EBS）的完整的限价订单簿数据集，我们的发现表明，欺骗在流动市场或主要电子交易平台上更有可能成功。相比之下，在缺乏流动性的市场或二级电子交易平台上，Ping可能更为普遍。