This study examines the interplay between political influence and regulatory decision-making. Political influence is captured based on whether a bank is headquartered in a state where an elected official holds a chair position on a congressional committee related to the banking and financial services industry. Using data of US commercial banks over the period 2000–2015, we show that our measure of political influence reduces a bank's probability of receiving a formal regulatory enforcement action. Results are robust to the use of alternative model specifications and the sample restrictions. However, we find that various bank and environmental characteristics are important conditional factors.

本研究考察了政治影响力与监管决策之间的相互作用。政治影响力是基于银行是否是总部设在民选官员持有有关银行和金融服务行业的一个国会委员会在座椅位置的状态抓获。使用2000年至2015年期间美国商业银行的数据，我们表明，我们对政治影响力的衡量降低了银行接受正式监管执行措施的可能性。结果对于使用替代模型规格和样品限制非常可靠。但是，我们发现各种堤岸和环境特征是重要的条件因素。