We introduce simple guilt into a generic prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and solve for the equilibria of the resulting psychological game. It is shown that for all guilt parameters, it is a pure strategy equilibrium that both players defect. But if the guilt parameter surpasses a threshold, a mixed strategy equilibrium and a pure strategy equilibrium in which both players cooperate emerge. We implement three payoff constellations of the PD game in a laboratory experiment and find in line with our equilibrium analysis that first- and second-order beliefs are highly correlated and that the probability of cooperation depends positively on these beliefs. Maximum likelihood estimations of a model of noisy introspection reveal that experimental data is best fitted with positive guilt levels and that omission of guilt results in a substantial increase in the noise parameters.

我们将简单的罪恶感引入一般囚徒困境（PD）游戏中，并解决由此产生的心理游戏的平衡问题。结果表明，对于所有罪恶感参数，这都是两个参与者都背叛的纯策略平衡。但是，如果罪恶感参数超过阈值，就会出现两个参与者合作的混合策略均衡和纯策略均衡。我们在实验室实验中实现了PD游戏的三个收益群，并根据我们的均衡分析发现，一阶和二阶信念高度相关，合作的可能性与这些信念成正比。