This study develops a business cycle search and matching model in which the volatility of employment closely matches that of the U.S. data without wage rigidity and the labor share overshoots in response to productivity shocks. To this end, I introduce an alternative mechanism of wage negotiations and bargaining shocks in an environment wherein a firm hires more than one worker and faces diminishing marginal product of labor (MPL). When Nash bargaining with a marginal worker breaks down, a firm negotiates wages with existing workers and produces with them. The breakdown in the negotiation with the marginal worker negatively affects the bargaining position of the firm with existing workers (one fewer workers) due to diminishing MPL because MPL is higher with one fewer workers. How much the firm internalizes this negative effect depends on the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers, which can be identified through labor share data. The stochastic bargaining power of existing workers provides an additional margin to increase the volatility of labor market variables, including wages.

这项研究建立了一个商业周期搜索和匹配模型，在该模型中，就业波动率与美国数据的波动率紧密匹配，而没有工资僵化现象，而劳动力份额因生产力冲击而超调。为此，我介绍了在公司雇用多于一个工人且面临边际劳动产品（MPL）减少的环境中的工资谈判和讨价还价冲击的另一种机制。当纳什与边缘工人的讨价还价破裂时，公司与现有工人进行工资谈判并与他们进行生产。与边际工人的谈判中的失误对公司与现有工人（少一个工人）的议价地位产生负面影响，这是由于MPL减少，因为MPL较高而少了一个工人。公司将这种负面影响内部化的程度取决于现有工人的随机议价能力，这可以通过劳动力共享数据来确定。现有工人的随机议价能力为增加劳动力市场变量（包括工资）的波动性提供了额外的余地。