This paper analyses the equilibrium of a two-person “pledge and give” game and tests its predictions in a lab experiment. Each person’s endowment is private information. In the first stage, each agent informs the other about the amount he/she intends to give. In the second stage, each agent makes a contribution to the joint donation. We show that a linear pledge function can be an equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, if agents have a strong taste for conformity, the equilibrium donation is positively related to one’s own endowment and to the pledge of his partner. In the lab, subjects pledged on average 60% of their income and donated on average 50% of their income. High pledges foster the generosity of the partner: an agent will increase the donation by 20 cents on average if the partner pledges one extra euro.

本文分析了两人“认捐”游戏的平衡，并在实验室实验中测试了其预测。每个人的天赋都是私人信息。在第一个阶段，每个代理商都会告知对方他/她打算给予的金额。在第二阶段，每个代理商都对联合捐赠作出贡献。我们证明了线性质押函数可以是博弈的平衡。此外，如果代理人对合规性怀有浓厚的兴趣，那么均衡捐赠与一个人的end赋及其伴侣的承诺成正比。在实验室中，受试者平均承诺收入的60％，平均捐赠收入的50％。高额认捐可以提高合作伙伴的慷慨：如果合作伙伴认捐一欧元，代理商平均将增加捐款20美分。