A classic issue in behavioral economics is the extent to which agents who make systematic mistakes have large effects on market outcomes. One perspective is that agents who make systematic mistakes have large effects on outcomes in settings characterized by strategic complementarity, but not in settings characterized by strategic substitutability. In this paper, we extend the experimental approach based on this perspective found in Cooper, Schneider, and Waldman (2017) concerning beauty contest experiments to the pricing game initially investigated in Fehr and Tyran (2008). Our main results are as follows: i) given strategic complementarity and multiple identical shocks, convergence to equilibrium play after an initial shock and the initial subsequent shocks is not immediate even though the shocks are identical; ii) the periodic introduction of inexperienced players given strategic complementarity slows down speed of convergence to equilibrium play; and iii) behavior in the pricing game given strategic complementarity shows faster post-shock convergence after later shocks than we found in our earlier paper for the beauty contest. In addition to showing these results, we discuss what the two papers suggest concerning how to model settings characterized by agents who vary in terms of their abilities to process information and form expectations.

行为经济学中的一个经典问题是，犯系统错误的代理商在多大程度上对市场结果产生影响。一种观点认为，犯有系统性错误的行为主体在以战略互补为特征的环境中对结果产生重大影响，而在以战略可替代性为特征的环境中对结果没有重大影响。在本文中，我们将基于Cooper，Schneider和Waldman（2017）关于选美比赛实验的观点出发的实验方法扩展到Fehr和Tyran（2008）最初研究的定价游戏中。我们的主要结果如下：i）考虑到战略上的互补性和多次相同的冲击，即使一次冲击是相同的，在一次初始冲击之后，收敛到均衡的过程也不是立即的；ii）考虑到战略互补性，定期引入经验不足的参与者会减慢收敛到均衡游戏的速度；iii）在具有战略互补性的情况下，定价游戏中的行为显示出震后的震荡收敛速度比我们先前在选美大赛论文中发现的速度要快。除了显示这些结果之外，我们还将讨论这两篇论文所提出的建议，这些建议涉及如何对以代理商为特征的设置进行建模，这些代理商的处理信息和形成期望的能力各不相同。