Little is known about why CEOs voluntarily purchase shares of their firm other than to earn direct profits. Since CEOs are risk-averse, undiversified, and face litigation costs from trading on private information, direct profits are unlikely to be the sole motive—especially since many purchases are ultimately unprofitable. We find that CEOs who have recently purchased shares are less likely to be terminated following poor performance and that this relation varies predictably with (i) their cost of purchasing shares, (ii) the profitability of their prior purchases, and (iii) their board's access to alternative sources of information about them. We find that some CEOs voluntarily purchase shares despite the cost of foregone diversification—and, sometimes outright unprofitability—to indirectly benefit by prolonging their tenure. Our estimates imply that the average abnormal returns that CEOs earn from their purchases increases from 3% to 58% after incorporating the indirect benefit of prolonged tenure.

除了为什么要获得直接利润外，很少有人知道首席执行官为什么会自愿购买他们公司的股票。由于CEO规避风险，不分散投资，并因交易私人信息而面临诉讼费用，因此直接利润不太可能是唯一动机，尤其是因为许多购买最终都无利可图。我们发现，最近购买股票的首席执行官不太可能因业绩不佳而被解雇，并且这种关系在以下方面可预测地发生变化：（i）购买股票的成本，（ii）先前购买的获利能力以及（iii）董事会的访问有关它们的替代信息源。我们发现，尽管放弃了多样化的成本（有时甚至是完全无利可图），一些CEO还是自愿购买股票，从而间接地通过延长他们的任期而受益。我们的估计表明，在考虑到长期任用的间接利益之后，CEO从购买中获得的平均非正常回报率将从3％增加到58％。