This paper proposes an empirical analysis to study if the quality of judicial decisions is influenced by the number and type of judges working in the court. A set of econometric models will be estimated in order to explain the differences existing in the confirmation rate of the sentences dictated by the 339 Spanish Labour Courts taken as a sample, over the period 2004–2017. The acting of other judges in the court, besides the incumbent judge, will be considered as a treatment. In addition, different control covariates as economic determinants and other factors closely related to judicial activity will be empirically analysed, taking into account possible endogeneity problems in the treatment variable. Main results show that the quality of judicial decisions decreases when other judges besides the incumbent one are acting in the court, but this effect is smaller when the other judges are non-professional judges. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the Economics of Court Performance, particularly on the empirical analysis of the quality of judicial decisions, and it also looks to provide relevant suggestions for judicial policy making.

本文提出了一项实证分析，以研究司法判决的质量是否受法院工作法官人数和类型的影响。为了解释2004年至2017年期间以339个西班牙劳动法院为样本的判决的确认率，将估算一套计量经济学模型。除现任法官外，其他法院法官的代理也将被视为一种待遇。此外，将根据经验来分析作为经济决定因素的其他控制协变量以及与司法活动密切相关的其他因素，并考虑到治疗变量中可能存在的内生性问题。主要结果表明，除现任法官以外，其他法官在法院行事时，司法裁决的质量也会下降；但是当其他法官为非专业法官时，这种影响较小。本文旨在为有关法院绩效经济学的文献做出贡献，特别是对司法判决质量的实证分析，并为司法决策提供相关建议。