We consider the implementability and welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a beauty contest model in which agents’ actions are strategic complements and their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. We obtain the following results: (i) if a social planner sells public information at a constant price, then multiple equilibria emerge and the partial announcement equilibrium becomes unstable; (ii) there exist pricing rules that ensure a unique and stable equilibrium partial publicity level, which indicates that a partial announcement policy can be implemented; and (iii) as the precision of public information increases, the optimal price rises due to higher optimal publicity level. To realize the higher optimal publicity level in equilibrium, the social planner must reset the pricing rules to lower the price of public information for each publicity level.

我们使用选美比赛模型考虑部分公告政策的可实施性和福利效果，其中代理人的行动是战略补充，他们对公共信息获取的决定是内生的。我们得到以下结果：（i）如果一个社会计划者以不变的价格出售公共信息，那么就会出现多重均衡，部分公告均衡变得不稳定；(ii) 存在定价规则，保证唯一且稳定的均衡部分公示水平，表明可以实施部分公示政策；(iii) 随着公共信息精度的提高，最优价格因更高的最优公开水平而上升。实现更高的均衡最优宣传水平，