Compensation researchers and practitioners often wrestle with issues of how organizations manage pay-for-performance (PFP) systems. Research has mostly addressed employee work outcomes of pay practices and has largely considered the PFP system as a static mechanism. We build a cyclical process model of how PFP systems are enacted, transformed, and managed in firms, ultimately providing a theoretical basis for enhancing the understanding of PFP system design and effectiveness. Drawing upon agency theory, cybernetic theory, and Bowen and Ostroff (2004)’s HRM system strength approach, our model identifies critical factors—PFP system formalization, PFP distinctiveness, PFP consistency, and PFP consensus —that influence control over PFP system implementation in organizations. In particular, our model addresses the critical role of managers in implementing and synthesizing PFP systems, which ultimately influences the design of PFP systems over time. Our model explains how the misalignment of espoused and enacted PFP practices is created and resolved in organizations.

薪酬研究人员和从业人员经常与组织如何管理绩效工资 (PFP​​) 系统的问题作斗争。研究主要关注薪酬实践的员工工作成果，并在很大程度上将 PFP 系统视为一种静态机制。我们建立了一个关于 PFP 系统如何在企业中制定、转换和管理的循环过程模型，最终为增强对 PFP 系统设计和有效性的理解提供了理论基础。利用代理理论、控制论理论和 Bowen 和 Ostroff (2004) 的 HRM 系统强度方法，我们的模型确定了影响对 PFP 系统实施控制的关键因素——PFP 系统形式化、PFP 独特性、PFP 一致性和 PFP 共识。组织。特别是，我们的模型解决了管理者在实施和综合 PFP 系统中的关键作用，这最终会随着时间的推移影响 PFP 系统的设计。我们的模型解释了如何在组织中创建和解决所支持和制定的 PFP 实践的不一致。