This paper studies the Swedish experience of the international crisis of 1907, which is often compared with the crisis of 2008. By constructing a new dataset from previously unanalyzed monthly bank-level data, we document high-frequency changes in bank outcomes throughout the 1907 crisis. While distressed banks suffered substantial withdrawals of foreign funds and liquid domestic liabilities, we show that banks’ asset structures, along with observable fundamentals and institutional characteristics, played a more significant role in their subsequent fate. Higher shares of non-performing assets and lending against equities were the most important balance sheet predictors of distress. These balance sheet fundamentals, as well as over-extended branch networks, significantly shortened the lifespan of Swedish banks in the aftermath of the 1907 crisis.

本文研究了瑞典在1907年国际危机中的经历，该经历经常与2008年的危机进行比较。通过从以前未经分析的每月银行水平数据构建新数据集，我们记录了整个1907年危机中银行业绩的高频变化。尽管陷入困境的银行遭受了大量的外国资金和流动性国内债务的提现，但我们表明，银行的资产结构以及可观察到的基本面和制度特征在其随后的命运中起着更为重要的作用。不良资产和股票贷款的较高份额是最重要的资产负债表危机指标。这些资产负债表的基本面以及过度扩张的分支机构网络，大大缩短了1907年危机后瑞典银行的使用寿命。