In this paper, we investigate whether federal deputies in Brazil display birthplace favoritism in allocating discretionary resources to municipalities via budgetary amendments. The data include information on three electoral cycles and on more than five thousand municipalities. Unlike previous research, we match data on an elected deputy’s share of votes by municipality and the value of the legislative amendments per capita obtained for each municipality by that deputy. Our results suggest that although resource distribution through amendments is smaller than targeted pork spending, birthplace favoritism is still an important driver of local politicians’ behavior. On average, when a Brazilian municipality is the place of birth of a deputy, it obtains 8.7% more amendments per capita than its counterparts. Additionally, our findings suggest that some deputies display birthplace favoritism because they plan to run for mayor in their hometown in subsequent elections.

在本文中，我们调查了巴西的联邦代表在通过预算修正案向市政当局分配可支配资源时是否表现出出生地偏袒。数据包括三个选举周期和五千多个城市的信息。Unlike previous research, we match data on an elected deputy's share of votes by municipality and the value of the legislative amendments per capita obtained for each municipality by that deputy. 我们的结果表明，虽然通过修正案进行的资源分配小于目标猪肉支出，但出生地偏爱仍然是当地政治家行为的重要驱动因素。平均而言，当巴西自治市是议员的出生地时，其人均获得的修正案比同行多 8.7%。此外，