International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.

国际组织 (IO) 经常推动成员国的政策变化。鉴于国际组织对成员国的政治影响力有限，先前的研究认为，国际组织依靠硬压力（即条件性）和软压力（即社会化）的组合来实现其政治目标。扩展这些文献，我们假设 IO 可以通过旨在增强关键行政单位政治独立性的贷款条件来增强其政治影响力。在国际货币基金组织 (IMF) 的背景下研究这种机制，我们认为，通过规定中央银行的结构性贷款条件（CBI 条件），IMF 授权中央银行获得更多的政治影响力，目的是限制政府的能力(ab) 使用货币政策谋取政治利益。IMF 将货币当局与各自的政府分开，打算改变政治动态，以实现更好的计划合规性并增强长期宏观金融稳定性。依靠包含 1980 年至 2012 年间多达 124 个国家的数据集，我们发现 IMF 将 CBI 条件部署到制衡较少、中央银行独立性较低以及政府更依赖公共债务货币化的国家。