We study how the opportunity to trade in trash might influence the equilibrium outcome when the tax on the externality is determined by a political economy process. In our model, individuals have heterogeneous preferences for environmental quality, and there is a wastage of real resources when funds are transferred from the pressure groups to the politicians. When hard-core environmentalists and capitalists are organized interest groups while moderate environmentalists are not organized, we find that the politically chosen tax on the externality is below the optimal Pigouvian level. The opportunity to export waste in unlimited quantities, but at a price, is not the environmentalists’ panacea and does not eliminate political social tension and suboptimal results.

我们研究了当政治经济学过程决定对外部性征税时，以垃圾交易的机会如何影响均衡结果。在我们的模型中，个人对环境质量有不同的偏好，并且当资金从压力集团转移到政客时，实际资源的浪费是浪费的。当顽固的环保主义者和资本家是有组织的利益集团而温和的环保主义者没有组织时，我们发现政治选择的对外部性的税收低于最优的庇古主义水平。出口废物的数量不受限制，但要付出一定的代价，这不是环保主义者的灵丹妙药，也不能消除政治上的社会紧张局势和不理想的结果。