I empirically examine whether autocratic governments use decoy voting in the United Nations General Assembly to hide repressive behavior of their regimes. Previous research has identified the State of Israel as a unique decoy. My sample includes votes on all 4,878 contested resolutions involving Israel between 1950 and 2018. The vote agreement rate of fully autocratic regimes with Israel is on average 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than among fully democratic governments for Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions. The effect is more pronounced for resolutions that primarily deal with the State of Israel, with an estimated decline in voting alignment of 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that autocratic governments use resolutions against the only Jewish-majority state to fill the voting agenda and deflect attention from their regimes.

我凭经验检查独裁政府是否在联合国大会中使用诱饵投票来掩盖其政权的镇压行为。先前的研究已将以色列国定为独特的诱饵。我的样本包括1950年至2018年间涉及以色列的所有4,878项有争议的决议的投票。与以色列的完全专制政权的投票协议率平均比以色列和巴勒斯坦的完全民主政府低3.2个百分点或标准差的18％。与问题相关的解决方案。对于主要涉及以色列国的决议，这种影响更为明显，估计投票结果下降了3.6个百分点或标准差的20％。