This study examines how direct democratic institutions affect income distribution before and after taxes. Based on a panel of Swiss cantons from 1945 to 2014, we test the effects of the constitutional reforms of direct democratic instruments. Our findings show that better voter access to the initiative induces policy shifts that significantly decrease top incomes and benefit the upper middle class. For the popular referendum we do not find such effects. The income effects of direct democracy are not a consequence of shifts in fiscal redistribution, but rather result from policy changes affecting pre-tax incomes.

中文翻译：

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倡议，全民投票和收入分配：对瑞士各州的实证分析

这项研究研究了直接民主制度如何影响税前和税后的收入分配。基于1945年至2014年的瑞士州小组，我们测试了直接民主文书的宪法改革的效果。我们的研究结果表明，更好的选民参与该计划的行为会引发政策转变，从而显着降低最高收入并造福中上阶层。对于受欢迎的全民投票，我们没有发现这样的影响。直接民主的收入影响不是财政再分配转移的结果，而是政策变化影响税前收入的结果。