We examine the effect of political connections and political cycles on stock returns of listed companies in Iran. Using 1146 firm-year observations derived from firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2005–2017, we find that political connections are positively associated with firms' annual actual returns and annual abnormal returns. Presidential elections strengthen the positive relationship between political connections and cumulative abnormal returns. Transfer of power to the Moderation (Principlist) party in 2013 (2005) strengthened (weakened) the positive relation between political connections and cumulative abnormal returns. Several sensitivity tests show that the results are not materially different from the main findings. Consistent with the political economy perspective, the findings suggest that political connections in a centrally planned economy are valuable for both parties and they become even more valuable in election years. Moreover, consistent with rational partisan theory, results suggest that investors react to political uncertainties stemming from presidential elections and transfer of power, even in emerging market economies like Iran.

我们研究了政治联系和政治周期对伊朗上市公司股票收益的影响。使用从2005-2017年在德黑兰证券交易所（TSE）上市的公司得出的1146个公司年观察结果，我们发现政治联系与公司的年度实际收益和年度异常收益呈正相关。总统选举加强了政治联系与累积异常回报之间的积极关系。2013年（2005年）向中庸党（原则党）移交权力，加强（削弱了）政治联系与累积的异常收益之间的积极关系。几次敏感性测试表明，结果与主要发现没有实质性差异。与政治经济学观点一致，研究结果表明，中央计划经济中的政治联系对双方都很重要，在选举年里它们甚至变得更有价值。此外，与理性的党派理论一致，结果表明，投资者对总统选举和权力移交所带来的政治不确定性做出反应，即使在像伊朗这样的新兴市场经济体中也是如此。