We investigate the dividend policies of firms in the United Kingdom to understand whether firms in different markets use dividends as a signaling or disciplining device. The sample consists of 1247 firms from the highly regulated Main Market (MAIN) and relatively unregulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) for the period 2002–2017. We find that firms in AIM pay lower dividends than their MAIN counterparts. However, during turbulence, AIM firms decrease dividends lower than MAIN firms. In line with the signaling hypothesis, AIM firms with increased profitability are more likely to increase dividends. These results suggest that AIM firms depend more on the signaling feature of the dividends, whereas MAIN firms use dividends as a disciplining device to limit managerial discretion. Specifically, we find that AIM firms facing bigger agency problems pay lower dividends compared to other AIM firms, in line with the outcome view of agency theory.

我们调查了英国公司的股息政策，以了解不同市场的公司是否使用股息作为信号或约束手段。样本包括 2002-2017 年期间高度监管的主要市场 (MAIN) 和相对不受监管的另类投资市场 (AIM) 的 1247 家公司。我们发现 AIM 中的公司支付的股息低于其主要同行。然而，在动荡期间，AIM 公司减少的股息低于 MAIN 公司。根据信号假设，盈利能力提高的 AIM 公司更有可能增加股息。这些结果表明 AIM 公司更多地依赖于红利的信号特征，而 MAIN 公司使用红利作为限制管理自由裁量权的约束手段。具体来说，