Abstract

The Condorcet Jury Theorem, along with empirical results, establishes the accuracy of majority voting in a broad range of conditions. Here we investigate whether naïve participants (in the U.S. and Japan) are aware of this accuracy. In four experiments, participants were provided with information about an assembly voting to decide on one of two options, one being better than the other. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were provided with specific parameters and they vastly underestimated the probability that the majority would select the right option. In Experiment 3, participants were provided with less specific information, and still underestimated the probability that the majority would select the right option. In Experiment 4, participants were asked to compare majority rules and supermajority rules. Most participants failed to grasp the relative weakness of supermajority rules. Our results are compatible with participant relying on a simple model of the voting situation based either on the competence of an individual voter, or on the minimum proportion required for a majority to form, making them largely blind to the “miracle of aggregation.”

摘要

Condorcet 陪审团定理连同实证结果确定了在广泛条件下多数投票的准确性。在这里，我们调查幼稚的参与者（在美国和日本）是否意识到这种准确性。在四个实验中，参与者被提供了关于大会投票的信息，以决定两个选项之一，一个比另一个更好。在实验 1 和 2 中，参与者被提供了特定参数，他们大大低估了大多数人选择正确选项的可能性。在实验 3 中，参与者被提供的具体信息较少，并且仍然低估了大多数人选择正确选项的可能性。在实验 4 中，参与者被要求比较多数规则和绝对多数规则。大多数参与者未能掌握绝对多数规则的相对弱点。我们的结果与依赖于基于单个选民的能力或形成多数所需的最低比例的简单投票情况模型的参与者兼容，这使他们在很大程度上对“聚合的奇迹”视而不见。