We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade‐off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Allowing for constrained delegation, we introduce the concepts of weak and strict delegation. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift, while the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm’s technology depends on how that uncertainty changes.

中文翻译：

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法规下放*

我们讨论了政府将监管权下放给官僚的激励措施。政府在其授权决定中面临一个折衷方案：官僚们知道政府所没有的行业中的公司，但是与此同时，他们除了政府之外还有其他偏好。偏好偏差和私人信息相互作用，以影响委托监管的动机。考虑到约束委派，我们介绍了弱授权和严格授权的概念。我们发现，官僚自由裁量权随着官僚主义漂移而减少，而关于公司技术的不确定性增加的影响取决于不确定性如何变化。