This article examines how the regional distribution of US military personnel contributed to military expenditures around the country. We first discuss a theory of political economy for military spending—officers who remain in service can eventually help channel military funds and employment to their respective regions of origin, through direct military spending decisions or indirect political channels. Further, if officer retention is positively related to less industrialization at home (fewer work opportunities at home induce greater service lengths), this channel will induce greater progressiveness in military spending. To test these ideas we use the personnel records of officers serving in the US Navy from 1870 to the late 1930s. Tracking the tenure of all officers, we construct measures of ‘military representation’ across US counties. Through ordinary least squares, Tobit, and instrumental variable approaches, we find that senior naval officer representation across regions positively and robustly predicts regional naval spending (but not spending from other branches) during the Second World War.

中文翻译：

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军官留任和军事支出：第二次世界大战期间军工联合体的崛起

本文研究了美国军事人员的区域分布如何导致全国军事支出的增长。我们首先讨论用于军事支出的政治经济学理论-继续服役的军官最终可以通过直接的军事支出决定或间接的政治渠道，将军事资金和就业机会分配到各自的原籍地区。此外，如果官员的留任与减少在家中的工业化（减少在家中的工作机会导致更长的服务年限）成正相关，则这种渠道将导致军费开支的更大进步。为了检验这些想法，我们使用了1870年至1930年代后期在美国海军服役的人员的人事记录。跟踪所有人员的任期，我​​们构建了美国各县的“军事代表”措施。