This paper presents a model of environmental regulations with firms that are heterogeneous with respect to the cost for reducing emissions to the legally permitted level. Given that the enforcement capacity is limited due to budgetary constraints and that each firm's inspection probability depends on its emissions relative to other firms’ emissions, the likelihood of being punished for violations is endogenously determined and multiple equilibria may therefore arise. Hence, both good outcomes with high compliance rates and bad outcomes with many violations are possible. Multiple equilibria are most likely to emerge at intermediate levels of deterrence and at low permitted emission levels. However, it is generally not straightforward how stricter legislation impacts on equilibrium outcomes, indicating that behavioral expectations among regulated firms are an important factor to consider when adapting enforcement to changes in the law.

本文提出了一个环境法规模型，其中涉及将排放量降低到法律允许水平的成本方面存在差异的公司。鉴于执法能力因预算限制而受到限制，并且每个公司的检查概率取决于其排放量相对于其他公司的排放量，因此内在确定了因违规而受到惩罚的可能性，因此可能会产生多重均衡。因此，既可以实现高遵守率的好结果，也可以实现许多违规的坏结果。多重平衡最有可能在威慑的中间水平和较低的允许排放水平上出现。但是，通常很难说出更严格的立法对平衡结果的影响，